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THE DEFAULTING PLAINTIFF IN
NORTH CAROLINA
JoHN E. MuLDER*
For more than a century the plight of the defaulting plaintiff' has
been a prolific source of controversy among courts and legal scholars.
2
Until 1834 the unpaid willful defaulter was generally not entitled to
judicial relief. This was the "common-law" rule.3  But in that year
the Supreme Court of New Hampshire fired the first shot in a hundred
year's legal war. Disregarding the hallowed precedents of the "com-
mon-law rule" that court, in the case of Britton v. Turner, created the
"modem rule," by granting succor (to the extent of $95) to a default-
ing laborer.4 The reverberations of that shot threw the legal world
into two camps, which have since then filled reams and reams of paper
with attacks upon and defenses of the simple decision., And by way of
demonstrating that the legal air still reverberates, another combatant
recently launched a well planned attack on the common law rule in com-
memoration of the centennial of Britton v. Turner.6 The present effort
is aimed at a review of the conflict in North Carolina.
A preliminary r~sum6 of what the opposing camps are fighting about
is perhaps in order. For, as in most contests (legal or otherwise), each
side carries on its banner certain symbols whose emotional appeal ral-
lies recruits to its support. Of course, each of the belligerents in this
instance has enlisted justice on its side.7 The protagonists of the
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of North Carolina.
' The term "defaulting plaintiff" is herein employed to designate one who, after
partial performance, abandons his contract without cause. It is thus broader
than, and inclusive of, the term, "willful defaulter." "Willful default" means
without cause; it does not necessarily involve elements of bad faith. The present
article includes within its scope both terms. Usually the contracts involved call
for payment in the entirety upon complete performance.
'KEENER, QUAsI-CoNTRACTS (1893) Chap. IV; WOODWARD, THE LAW OF QUASI
CONTRACTS (1913) Chap. X; Ashley, Britton v. Turner (1915) 24 YAa L. J. 544;
Ballantine, Forfeiture for Breach of Contract (1921) 5 MINN. L. REV. 329; Laube,
The Defaulting Employee (1935) 83 U. PA. L. Ray. 825; (1924) 24 CoL. L. Rv.
885.8 Laube, op. cit. subra note 2, at 828. In the present article, to conserve space,
the term "common-law rule" is employed to designate those cases denying relief,
and the term "modern rule" to designate those cases which, following Britton v.
Turner (see infra, note 4), permit recovery.
'6 N. H. 481 (1834). Plaintiff contracted to do farm labor, for one year, for
a total compensation of $120. He quit after nine and one half months of perform-
ance, the employer suffering no damage as a result.
See Supra note 2. *Laube, op. cit. supra note 2.
'An Iowa judge, defending Britton v. Turner, said: "It is bottomed on justice,
and is right on principle, however it may be upon the technical and more illiberal
rules of the common law, as found in the older cases." McClay v. Hedge, 18
Iowa 66, 68 (1864).
Criticizing the same case, Professor Woodward writes: "Considerations both
of justice and of policy forbid its approval." WOODWARD, QUASI CONTRACTS
(1913) 274.
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common-law rule, championed successively by Keener and Woodward,
have hoisted high the condition precedent as an instrument of justice.8
For since the days of Mansfield one who contracts to perform service
in exchange for a flat sum of cash must allege and prove performance.9
Two persuasive slogans buttress this point of view; one, a willful de-
faulter deserves no sympathy;1° and the other, to permit recovery in
such a case would be to encourage breaches of contract with impunity."1
An equally appealing slogan appears on the banner of the opponents
-the well established principle of compensation. Punitive damages, in
most jurisdictions, belong not to the law of contracts-the amount of
recovery is rather merely to compensate the innocent party for the
wrong inflicted upon him.' 2 Consequently, (runs this argument) the
common-law rule is indefensible, for in denying the willful defaulter
a recovery it in many instances allows to the defendant a benefit in ex-
cess of the damage suffered by him. Britton v. Turner, granting a re-
covery of the benefits ;conferred in excess of the damage suffered, is in
line with the glorified principle of compensation. And since the plain-
tiff is on recoupment or counterclaim liable for the damages caused by
his breach, willful default is not thereby encouraged.' 3
'Keener, op. cit. supra note 2, at 222; Woodward, op. cit. supra note 2, at 264-7
(Woodward's rationale is in terms of assumption of risk rather than conditions
precedent.) ; Laube, op. cit. supra note 2, at 827.
"If A condition precedent is to be got rid of thus readily, they are not made
of such 'stern stuff' as we have been taught to consider them." Redfield, J., dis-
senting in Fenton v. Clark, 11 Vt. 557, 567 (1839).
Professor Havighurst has made the plausible suggestion that the common-law
rule is but a device for keeping such cases away from juries, which would, in all
probability, be sympathetic to the plaintiff.
'Kingston v. Preston, 2 Doug. 689 (K. B. 1773); 3 WiLLISTON, CONTRACTS
(Rev. ed. 1936) §817.
0,,. ., one whose hands are soiled by willful wrongdoing is hardly in a
position seriously to complain. . . . But when it is remembered that the plain-
tiff's -position is the direct consequence of a willful and inexcusable violation of
his legal right and moral duty to the defendant, it is difficult to feel that the
result complained of is harsh or unjust. Better far that the innocent defendant
should profit by the breach than that the guilty plaintiff should be given a remedy
in spite of it ... " Woodward, op. cit. supra note 2, at 272.
" Smith v. Brady, 17 N. Y. 173, 187 (1858).
" Laube, op. cit. supra note 2 at 833; (1933) 11 N. C. L. RE V. 160; 84 A. L. R.
1336.
""This rule, by binding the employer to pay the value of the service he ac-
tually receives, and the laborer to answer in damages where he does not complete
the entire contract, will leave no temptation to the former to drive the laborer
from his service, near the close of his term, by ill treatment, in order to escape
from payment, nor to the latter to desert his service before the stipulated time,
without a sufficient reason. . . " Britton v. Turner, 6 N. H. 481, 494 (1834).
"He who is required to repair the damage he has done, does not violate his
contract with impunity. Reparation by the defaulting employee, and not enrich-
ment by the employer, is the principle of substantial justice. The tearful utter-
ances about the sacredness of solemn contracts is but the patter of solemn nonsense.
They indicate an over-zealous apprehension. Although the venerable history of
the condition precedent has enshrined it as a principle of justice, it now seems
crudely superficial." Laube, op. cit. supra note 2, at 831.
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Thus, it is apparent that each protagonist is guided by a principle
which has a strongly-felt significance in our jumbled system of juris-
prudence. But these principles, when applied to the case at hand, lead
to different results. To be sure, the buttressing arguments in support
of each purport to be factual-the one, that to grant a recovery en-
courages breach with impunity, the other that it does not. Yet in the
course of this century of combat, one looks in vain for empirical justifi-
cation of either point of view. 4
Professor Laube, who has recently reviewed the development since
the decision of Britton v. Turner, has skillfully pointed out that the
contest has elements of a class war between employer and employee. 15
Well established is the rule that a wrongfully discharged employee is
required to seek other work in mitigation of damages. Coexistent with
this, in so many jurisdictions, is the common-law rule which denies re-
covery to a defaulting employee. Such, says Professor Laube, is an
inexcusable denial of equality. 16  His argument is persuasive. 17  In
14Such a study might well vindicate the argument of either group. An even
split would be at least revealing. Not easy, such an investigation is by no means
impossible. Significant it may be that courts following Britton v. Turner have
not been overburdened with an influx of actions by defaulting plaintiffs.
" Laube, op. cit. supra note 2, at 844-851. Such is the general theme of the
argument. The vigorous tone of the writer indicates his firm belief in his point
of view. Purposely partisan, he pulls no punches. His persuasive words should
be helpful to the lawyer arguing on behalf of a defaulting plaintiff.
" The inequality is manifest, if two cases be considered side by side. (a) Un-
der the common-law rule, the defaulting employee, having performed satisfactorily
for several months, recovers nothing if he abandons the contract. The benefits
thus retained by the employer may be greatly in excess of the damage he has
suffered. Particularly would this be true where, as in Britton v. Turner, the em-
ployer suffered no damage. And this entirely at the expense of the employee,
for the employer is required to do nothing by way of reducing the employee's loss.
(b) Conversely, if the employee be wrongfully discharged, he is required to seek
other employment by way of mitigating the employer's loss. Failing to take ad-
vantage of other opportunities for employment, he has his damages proportionately
reduced. The result is that the defaulting employee in effect pays punitive dam-
ages, but the employer who discharges his employee without cause is liable only
for compensatory damages.
If a court be adamant in its refusal to follow Britton v. Turner, Professor
Laube suggests, as an alternative for removing this inequality, restoration of
the now generally abandoned doctrine of constructive service. Under this theory,
a wrongfully discharged employee, by remaining ready and willing to perform,
is constructively performing, and may recover his wages in full. He need not
seek other employment in mitigation. The doctrine has become practically obso-
lete upon the ground that it encourages idleness. Howard v. Daly, 61 N. Y. 362,
373 (1875); cf. Smith v. Cashie and Chowan R-R. & Lumber Co., 142 N. C. 26,
54 S. E. 788 (1906). Establishment of desired equality by resurrecting the doc-
trine of constructive service is akin to modern manufacturing by old-fashioned
methods. Adoption of Britton v. Turner as a more desirable alternative should
call forth few dissents.
"' The writer finds himself in sympathy with the result Professor Laube seeks
to achieve. The argument of the latter is not one of pure logic; it represents a
social point of view; it is based upon a factual inequality which operates seriously
to the detriment of the laborer.
As a matter of logic, however, Professor Laube's analogy between the laborer
who wilfully defaults and one who is wrongfully discharged, is open to question.
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the gradual succession of concessions, so begrudgingly granted to labor,
the next step is adoption of the precept of Britton v. Turner.
Still another suggested weapon for the laborer has recently been
methodically developed.' 8 In long term service contracts, though a pe-
riodic rate of compensation is expressly designated, courts are prone
to treat the obligation as entire.19 The result, if Britton v. Turner be
not followed, is that a plaintiff who has performed satisfactorily for
several of the designated periods, is denied any relief whatsoever if he
voluntarily abandons work prior to the end of the term. The sugges-
tion is that, consistently with the so called systematic body of common-
law rules of contract, this may be changed. Where there exists a con-
tract for a year at a monthly rate of compensation, courts may easily
treat the agreement as divisible rather than entire.20 Hence, if after
working for six and one-half months the employee defaults, he may re-
cover on the contract for the six units of service which he has satis-
factorily completed (subject to the damages inflicted by the breach).
As to the remaining half month, the application of Britton v. Turner
would permit a quantum ineruit recovery.
Such discussion is a woefully brief commentary upon the argu-
mentative weapons of the opposing camps. Amplification would be
but repetition of their efforts, and seems hardly efficacious. There re-
mains, then, to consider how the defaulting plaintiff has fared before
the North Carolina Court.
It must be admitted that this judiciary has not consistently favored
either of the opposing camps.
In Britton v. Turner the New Hampshire court refused to differen-
A closer analogy exists between the defaulting laborer and the employer who,
having overpaid his employee, then wrongfully terminates the contract, and seeks
to recover the amount of the overpayment. Such cases are not to be found among
the reports; they seldom occur. It 'seems to be generally held that a salesman
who, under a contract of definite duration, overdraws his account, is not required
to repay the amount of the overdraft, when the contract is terminated. (See cases
collected in 57 A. L. R. 33). But in most of these cases the contracts were termi-
nated by lapse of time or -by mutual agreement.
"McGowan, Divisibility of Employment Contracts (1935) 21 IoWA L. REv. 50.
"' Williston sees a trend in the direction of finding contracts divisible. 2 WIn.
LISTON, CONTRACTS (1920) §862. (But the statement is omitted in his revised edi-
tion.) Mr. McGowan states that since there are so few recent cases on the sub-
ject, the majority rule is still against finding such contracts divisible.
2""A contract under which the whole performance is divided into two sets of
partial performances, each part of each set being the agreed exchange for a cor-
responding part of the set of performances to be rendered -by the other promisor,
is called a divisible contract." WILLISrON, CONTRACTS (Rev. ed. 1936) §860A.
To which Mr. McGowan adds, "Over and above this there must be found agree-
ment or intention of the parties that the contract they have made is to be so
divided." McGowan, op. cit. supra note 18, at 52. Even if this addition is to be
taken seriously, it is remarkable how easily an astute court can find such intent
when it seems desirable. And in the large number of cases where direct evidence
of intent is lacking, a presumption of divisibility would be helpful to the laborer,
and would obviate the hardship of an antithetical rule.
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diate between the rights of a defaulting employee and those of a de-
faulting seller under a contract for the sale of goods. 2' For reasons
never satisfactorily articulated some courts which have consistently de-
nied recompense to a defaulting employee have granted relief to a de-
faulting seller.22 The Uniform Sales Act provides that if the buyer
retains the goods knowing that the seller intends not to perform the
contract in full, he must pay for them at the contract rate. If, how-
ever, the buyer has used or disposed of the goods delivered before he
knows of the seller's intent to default before performing in full, the
buyer will not be liable for more than the fair value to him of the goods
so received.23 Many of the thirty-one States which have adopted the
Uniform Sales Act have repudiated Britton v. Turner.24 Why?
Sales of Goods
For convenience in organization, the sales and employment cases
will be discussed separately. The North Carolina legislature, unfortu-
nately, has not yet adopted the Uniform Sales Act.25  But it is to its
credit that the North Carolina court has never consciously distinguished
between sales and employment contracts where the plaintiff is in de-
fault. In fact, the cases have been cited indiscriminately.2 6 Here, how-
ever, the uniformity ceases.
Thirteen times the North Carolina Supreme Court has been called
upon to adjudicate the rights of a seller who has defaulted after part
performance.27 In nine of these instances it was recognized that a re-
covery should be granted for the part performance; four times the seller
was left "holding the bag." How fortunate if the latter four had been
first chronologically, and hence, since disapproved. But the line has
not been so drawn. The first three, arising respectively in 1841, 1848,
and 1851, permitted recovery.2 8  There followed three to the contrary
in 1855, 1859, and 1870.29 In no instance was the inconsistency ex-
plained by the court. Then, in order, the following results were ob-
tmBritton v. Turner, 6 N. H. 481, 490 (1834).
Laube. op. cit. supra note 2, at 842.
§44; 2 WILLISrON, SALES (2nd ed. 1924) §460.
See supra, note 22.
= Twice submitted, it has both times failed of enactment when the legislature
became involved in seemingly more important business.
'Thus, in Dula v. Cowles, 47 N. C. 454 (1855) a sales case, denying recovery,
reliance was placed upon White v. Brown, 47 N. C. 403 (1855), which involved
a defaulting employee. And in Indian Mountain Jellico Coal Co. v. Asheville Ice
and Coal Co., 134 N. C. 574, 47 S. E. 116 (1904), also a sales case, the court relied
upon Britton v. Turner.
= Included herein are dicta, and instances of defective performances, as well as
cases involving willful default. That is, they deal with inexcusable breach by the
plaintiff.
' Carter v. McNeely, 23 N. C. 448 (1841) ; Freeman v. Skinner, 31 N. C. 32
(1848); McEntyre v. McEntyre, 34 N. C. 299 (1851).
'Dula v. Cowles, 47 N. C. 454 (1855); Dula v. Cowles, 52 N. C. 290 (1859);
Russell v. Stewart, 64 N. C. 487 (1870).
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tained: two sellers recovered,3 0 one lost,3' and the last four were suc-
cessful.3 2
In Russell v. Stewart, decided in 1870,33 where recovery was denied,
the court used language typically employed by courts which have re-
fused to adopt Britton v. Turner. Apparently the contract called for
payment in Confederate money. Having delivered fifty bushels of
wheat, one-half the total amount, the seller wropgfully refused to com-
plete performance unless paid in specie (about twice the amount due in
Confederate money). In defense of its position the court said, "The
harshness of this rule has sometimes been the subject of criticism; but
it is justified upon the ground that it is more important to compel parties
to stand by their contracts than it is to relieve the few hard cases which
arise under it .... If the biter has been bitten, it will perhaps admon-
ish him and others to stand firmly by their contracts in the future."3 4
On the other hand, in Indian Mountain Jellico Coal Company v.
Asheville Ice and Coal Company, the court in 1904, granting recovery
for part performance to a defaulting seller, incorporated in its opinion
the following words of an Iowa judge, in approving Britton v. Turner:
"'That celebrated case has been criticized, doubted, and denied to be
sound, yet its principles have been gradually winning their way into
professional and judicial favor. It is bottomed on justice and is right
upon principle, however it may be upon the technical and more illiberal
rules as found in the older cases.' -35
However, from these cases, a prediction may be ventured. It is to
be noted that not since 1895 has a defaulting seller been denied relief,
and then only by dictum. (The last holding to that effect seems to
have been in 1870.)36 On the other hand, four times since that date,
the last being in 1926, recovery has been granted.3 7 Indian Mountain
Jellico Coal Company v. Asheville Ice and Coal Company, decided in
1904, and often cited as a leading case, may possibly be recognized as
a definite turning point. If so, perhaps the right of a defaulting seller
to recover for part performance has become definitely established. This
prophecy assumes that subsequent employment contract cases, to be
hereafter discussed, will not lead in the opposite direction.
Another aid in permitting recovery has already been briefly sketched;
'Howie v. Rea, 70 N. C. 559 (1874) ; Brown v. Morris, 83 N. C. 252 (1880).
"See Ducker v. Cochrane, 92 N. C. 597 (1885).
'Indian Mountain Jellico Coal Co. v. Asheville Ice and Coal Co., 134 N. C. 574,
47 S. E. 116 (1904) ; Willis v. Jarrett Construction Co., 152 N. C. 100, 67 S. E.
265 (1910) ; Maney v. Greenwood, 182 N. C. 579. 109 S. E. 636 (1921) ; Ritchie
v. Ritchie, 192 N. C. 538, 135 S. E. 458 (1926).
364 N. C. 487.
"Russell v. Stewart, 64 N. C. 487, 488 (1870).
134 N. C. 574, 580, 47 S. E. 116, 118 (1904).
" Russell v. Stewart, 64 N. C. 487 (1870).' Supra, note 32.
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that of holding the contract divisible where its terms lend themselves
to that interpretation, resulting in recovery on the contract for the units
performed. 38 Perhaps the North Carolina court has gone as far as
any in this respect. It has shown a willingness to treat contracts as
divisible unless clearly shown to have been intended otherwise.39 This
is laudable.
An element of confusion is injected into some of the sales cases
where the court, in permitting recovery, intimates that were plaintiff's
default willful, recovery would be denied.4 0 No precise distinction
between a default which is willful and one which is not has been spelled
out. Perhaps the court feels that in the former an element of bad faith
is involved. From a purely compensatory point of view the distinction
is unsound. Fortunately the distinction has not been elevated to the
dignity of a square holding.
Employnent Cases
In employment cases, as in those involving sales of goods, the North
Carolina cases lack consistency. The course of decisions has followed
a zig-zag, rather than a straight and narrow, path. The question first
appeared in a dictum in Clayton v. Blake, decided in 1844.41 Though a
willful breach was not directly involved, the case indicates that a quan-
tum meruit recovery would be allowed where plaintiff has been guilty
of a breach of a building contract. In chronological order thereafter
the following results were obtained: one case granting recovery,42 one
denying,43 one granting,44 three denying, 45 one granting,46 one deny-
"McGowan, op. cit. supra note 18.
'* This has not always been true. In Dula v. Cowles, 52 N. C. 290 (1859),
Pearson, C. J., intimated that a contract would not be considered divisible unless
made expressly so by its terms. See also Russell v. Stewart, 64 N. C. 487 (1870).
But the tide turned in Chamblee v. Baker, 95 N. C. 98 (1886). The tendency to
treat contracts as divisible seems to have become well established when Indian
Mountain Jellico Coal Co. v. Asheville Ice and Coal Co., 134 N. C. 574, 47 S. E.
116 (1904), and Willis v. Jarrett Construction Co., 152 N. C. 100, 67 S. E. 265
(1910) were decided.
*' Brown v. Morris, 83 N. C. 252 (1880); Maney v. Greenwood, 182 N. C.
579, 109 S. E. 636 (1921). In the latter case the court, in permitting recovery,
pointed out that the default was not willful. The facts do not indicate whether
there was a bona fide, but ineffective, attempt to perform in full.
4 26 N. C. 497. The action was in debt, and hence on the express contract. A
building contract was involved. Such are herein treated with employment con-
tracts, because only in Missouri is a distinction made between the two. In that
Sta,te recovery is granted to a defaulting building contractor, but is denied in
other types of agreements. "This peculiarity of the Missouri law has been said
to be due to the fact that the visible and tangible fruit of the builder's part per-
formance is so realistically presented to the judicial eye that equity prevails."
Laube, op. cit. supra note 2, 839-841; (1924) 24 CoL. L. REv. 885, 888.
Dover v. Plemmons, 32 N. C. 23 (1848).
1Winstead v. Reid, 44 N. C. 76 (1852). The court relies upon Cutter v.
Powell, 6 T. R. 320 (1795). That famous case involved a contract to pay a
sailor a specified sum, provided he performed his duties on the ship to and
from the port of Liverpool, on a specified trip. Recovery for part perform-
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ing.47 four granting,48 one denying,49 two granting,5" and a final case,
decided in 1934, denying relief.5 ' Thus, ten times Britton v. Turner
has been followed, and seven times the common-law rule. Confusion
has herein found its masterpiece. Prediction seems almost futile.
But the above enumeration is subject to qualification. The ten cases
cited as following Britton v. Turner are not all square holdings. They
include dicta-cases where plaintiff sued unsuccessfully on the con-
tract, or where he sued on quantum reruit and failed because he could
not show that defendant had received a benefit from the part perform-
ance.52 But in each instance there is language to the effect that had a
benefit been conferred, plaintiff could have recovered to that extent in
quantum meruit.
Obviously the early cases denying recovery are based on the common-
law rule. They rely chiefly upon the early case of Winstead v. Reid,
which emphasizes the conventional argument that plaintiff, not having
performed his conditions precedent, has no standing in court.
5 3
In Winston v. Reid plaintiff quit without cause, after half comple-
tion of a contract to build additions to defendant's house. Emphasis
was placed upon the fact that the contract was entire and indivisible.
Cutter v. Powell was cited as an authority, but that celebrated English
case has been adequately distinguished. 4
ance was denied. The case is distinguishable from that of a willful defaulter
upon two grounds: (1) The cause for the non-performance was the death
of the sailor. (2) The opinion indicates that the risk of full performance was
assumed by the sailor in consideration of a higher than customary compensation.
WOODWARD, QUASI CONTRACTS (1913) §113; (1924) 24 COL. L. Rnv. 885, n. 2.
"See Byerly v. Kepley, 46 N. C. 35 (1853).
'White v. Brown, 47 N. C. 403 (1855) ; Brewer v. Tysor. 48 N. C. 181 (1855),
on a retrial, plaintiff recovered by proving the contract divisible, Brewer v. Tysor,
50 N. C. 173 (1857); Niblett v. Herring, 49 N. C. 262 (1857).
"Gorham v. Bellamy, 82 N. C. 497 (1880).
' Thigpen v. Leigh, 93 N. C. 47 (1885) (involving a sharecropper's contract).
'Chamblee v. Baker, 95 N. C. 98 (1886) ; Booth v. Ratcliffe, 107 N. C. 6, 12
S. E. 112 (1890); Simpson v. Carolina Cent. R. R., 112 N. C. 703, 16 S. E. 853
(1893) ; Dixon v. Gravely, 117 N. C. 84, 23 S. E. 39 (1895).
" Beacom v. Boing, 126 N. C. 136, 35 S. E. 250 (1900), involving a share-
cropper's contract, and relying upon Thigpen v. Leigh, 93 N. C. 47 (1885), supra,
note 47.
'See Corinthian Lodge v. Smith, 147 N, C. 244, 61 S. E. 49 (1908) ; MeCurry
v. Purgason, 170 N. C. 463, 87 S. E. 244 (1915).
' Lipe v. Citizens Bank and Trust Co., 206 N. C. 24, 173 S. E. 316 (1934).
' (a) Action on contract, with dictum recognizing right of quantum ncruit
recovery, Clayton v. Blake, 26 N. C. 497 (1844) ; Corinthian Lodge v. Smith, 147
N. C. 244, 61 S. E. 49 (1908).
(b) Recognizing right of quantum ineruit recovery, provided defendant has re-
ceived a enefit, Byerly v. Kepley, 46 N. C. 35 (1853).
(c) Recognizing right of quantum tneruit recovery, but defendant also guilty
of breach, McCurry v. Purgason, 170 N. C. 463, 87 S. E. 244 (1915).
344 N. C. 76 (1852).
a See supra, note 43.
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Before many years, however, the language of the opinions clearly
indicates a disposition to relax the rigors of the strict common-law rule.
The sting was taken from its bite. The crucial turning point, previously
foreshadowed, appears to have taken place in the famous case of Cham-
blee v. Baker, decided in 1886.55 Plaintiff, a farm laborer, was em-
ployed under an agreement to extend from February until the end of
the year. It was agreed that the contract was entire. Seven months
later he left without cause, defendant sustaining po damage. Plaintiff
recovered in quantum reruit. Noting expressly the previous decisions
in which recovery was denied, the court said: "The manifest injustice
upon such technical grounds, of refusing all compensation for work
done and not completed, or for goods supplied short of the stipulated
quantity, and of allowing the party to appropriate them to his own
use, without paying-anything, has often been felt and expressed by the
judges, and a mode sought by which the wrong could be remedied.
"'The inclination of the courts is to relax the stringent rule of the
common law, which allows no recovery upon a special unperformed
contract, nor for the value of the work done, because the special,. ex-
cludes an implied contract to pay. In such case, if the party has de-
rived any benefit from the labor done, it would be unjust to allow him to
retain that without paying anything. Accordingly, restrictions are im-
posed upon the general rule, and it is confined to contracts entire and
indivisible, and when by the nature of the agreement, or by express pro-
vision, nothing is to be paid till all is performed.' "56 (Italics added.)
Rigid adherence to this modified rule would result in a denial of re-
covery only as to contracts most carefully drafted to meet precisely
such contingencies. If in those cases, prior and subsequent, which
denied recovery, the contracts were expressly made entire, and pro-
vided against payment before complete performance, then there is no
conflict. But the language of Chamblee v. Baker itself reveals that the
common-law rule was having the thorns removed from its stem.
The actual decision seems to go even beyond the confines of its
liberalized formula. The contract was expressly stated to be entire,
yet the court "discovered" in the fact that twenty dollars had been paid
at some time during the seven months an intent that full performance'
was not a prerequisite of recovery.
In some respects this decision has been justifiably recognized as
epochal. It has been approved and followed, and never once has the
T Foreshadowed in Gorham v. Bellamy, 82 N. C. 497 (1880), accomplished in
Chamblee v. Baker, 95 N. C. 98 (1886). This turning point, crucial in that it
changed the law for several years, became less so when the court more recently
reverted to the earlier cases. See infra notes 58 and 59.
95 N. C. 98, 101 (1886).
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court uttered against it a word of disapproval.5 Substantially in line
with Britton v. Turner, it has with that case been accorded equal local
praise. How strange then that mingled with subsequent cases are two
in which the court proceeded as if Chamblee v. Baker had never been
decided, and relied instead upon the harsh rule of Winstead v. Reid.
The first of these, decided in 1900, involved indirectly the rights of a
defaulting sharecropper.5 8 Perhaps such a case is in line with the rea-
soning of Chamblee v. Baker. It is"at least arguable that as to share-
cropper contracts, economic reasons exist for withholding payment un-
til performance has been completed. But this distinction does not ap-
pear in the opinion.
Less easily explained, however, is the recent case of Lipe v. Citizens
Bank and Trust Company.59 Here there was a contract to perform
services for an elderly lady, in exchange for a promise to devise all her
property to plaintiff. Testatrix died, leaving an estate valued at ap-
proximately $16,000, and devising only $3,000 to plaintiff. The action
included cotints on the contract and in quantum meruit. There was a
finding of fact that plaintiff had not performed his contract, but he was
allowed $3,000 in quantum meruit by the lower court. This was re-
versed. Citing no authority, Mr. Justice Clarkson resolved the mat-
ter with dispatch: "In the present case the jury found on the first issue
that there was a 'special contract,' and on the second issue that it was
'breached.' The finding on these two issues, the fifth issue, quantum
reruit, became inoperative." 60  If this decision represents the law of
North Carolina today, then the court has, without explaining away an
imposing line of cases, reverted to the pre-Chamblee v. Baker "horse
and buggy" days.
The plaintiff Lipe was fortunate in escaping the effect of the court's
regression. On a subsequent trial, he obtained a finding that he had
performed his contract in full, and received an affirmance on appeal. 6'
Yet on the facts found, the original decision before the Supreme Court
stands as its latest pronouncement of the plight of the defaulting
plaintiff.
Alleviating the harshness of the common-law rule by a policy of
holding contracts divisible where possible has already been discussed.
'Followed in Booth v. Ratcliffe, 107 N. C. 6, 12 S. E. 112 (1890); Indian
Mountain Jellico Coal Co. v. Asheville Ice and Coal Co., 134 N. C. 574, 47 S. E.
116 (1904) (sales contract) ; Willis v. Jarrett Construction Co., 152 N. C. 100, 67
S. E. 265 (1910) (sales contract).
Beacom v. Boing, 126 N. C. 136, 35 S. E. 250 (1900). The action was by a
mortgagee of a sharecropper, to foreclose his lien. The court held that the lien
was lost when -the sharecropper defaulted in performance of his contract with the
owner of the land.
r'206 N. C. 24, 173 S. E. 316 (1934).
°206 N. C. 24, 30; 173 S. E. 316, 319 (1934).
SLipe v. Citizens Bank and Trust Co., 207 N. C. 794, 178 S. E. 665 (1935).
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In this respect, too, Chamblee v. Baker appears as a vital turning point
in judicial attitude. 2 This has subsequently found frequent manifesta-
tions. At times it is effected by interpretation of the contract; i. e., where
rates of compensation are specified for successive units of perform-
ance.63 Or the same result has been obtained by the type of proof of-
fered. For example, in Brewer v. Tysor, plaintiff, a willful defaulter,
failed to recover. But on a new trial he secured a judgment for units
performed by proving that the contract was divisible.64
This, to date, ends the checkered career of the defaulting plaintiff in
North Carolina. In employment and in sales contracts his hopes for
future victories depend largely upon his ability to employ Indian Moun-
tain Jellico Coal Company v. Asheville Ice and Coal Company6  and
Chamblee v. Baker66 as effective implements of legal warfare, and in
his power to convince the court that his contract is divisible.
One writer has observed that the defaulting plaintiff has with less
frequency sought relief in the past quarter century. 67 Since the ques-
tion has been before the North Carolina court eight times since 1900,68
this statement is not locally applicable. Small wonder, since the two lines
of authority make prediction by the attorney so much a matter of guess-
work. Favorable legislation has in other jurisdictions rendered legal
battles less frequently necessary. Most important is that requiring
'That is, the common law rule of no recovery "is confined to contracts entire
and indivisible, and when by the nature of the agreement, or by express provision,
nothing is to be paid till all is performned" Chamblee v. Baker, 95 N. C. 98, 102
(1886). The suggestion of Mr. McGowan, to which reference has been pre-
viously made (see supra, note 18), is that if the contract is found to be divisible,
plaintiff's recovery for units performed would be by action on the contract. It is
not clear whether the above quotation from Chamblee v. Baker calls for an action
on the contract or in quantum inerudt. The action in that case was in quantum
mneruit. But in Johnson v. Dunn, 51 N. C. 122 (1858) it was on the contract,
Pearson, C. J., finding the agreement divisible. Plaintiff recovered in both cases.
See also, infra, note 64.
' In Johnson v. Dunn, 51 N. C. 122 (1858) the rate of compensation was $25
per month. The court held the contract divisible, in spite of an express provision
for payment in a flat sum at the end of the year. See also Wooten v. Walters,
110 N. C. 251, 14 S. E. 736 (1892), contract for sale of building and stock of
goods; Pasquotank and N. River Steamboat Co. v. Eastern Carolina Transportation
Co., 166 N. C. 582, 82 S. E. 956 (1914), contract for hire of steamboat every
Sunday, at $80 per Sunday, for a specified period. For an early case to the con-
trary, involving an employment contract, see White v. Brown, 47 N. C. 403 (1855).
" Brewer v. Tysor, 48 N. C. 181 (1855) ; Brewer v. Tysor, 50 N. C. 173 (1857).
The action on the second trial was on the contract.
' Supra, note 35.
' Supra, note 55.
vMcGowan, Divisibility of tEnployment Contracts (1935) 21 IOWA L. REv.
50, 66.
'See supra, notes 32, 49, 50 and 51. It may be true, even in North Carolina,
that in many instances the defaulting laborer chooses to suffer a loss rather than
incur the expense of carrying his case through the courts, with the spectre of an
unfavorable decision in the offing. It is not improbable also, that trial courts in
the State are disposing of the cases in a sensible manner.
THE NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
payment of wages at frequent intervals. 69 Such legislation in North
Carolina. is conspicuously absent. 70 Speculation as to the causes sug-
gests legislative inertia, or the lack of organized pressure among those
most interested-unskilled laborers. In many respects such legislation
may be now unnecessary. Indeed, for factory hands, the problem is
perhaps largely non-existent. Their employment is from week to week,
and in like manner are they paid.
But for present purposes such legislation is beside the point. It is
usually applicable only to employers operating on a fairly large scale.
Not one of the cases discussed in this paper involved a factory hand.
Rather they include farm hands, sharecroppers, one who promises to
support in exchange for a flat sum or a devise of land, one who occa-
sionally contracts to do a specific piece of labor, etc. All these latter
remain beyond the legislative pale. At present they can only hope for
a judicial attitude of friendliness toward the rule of Britton v. Turner.
'McGowan, Divisibility of Employment Contracts (1935), 21 IowA L. REv. 50,
69-78; Laube, The Defaulting Employee (1935) 83 U. OF PA. L. REV. 825, 844-7,
850-1.
IN. C. CoDe ANN. (Michie, 1935) §6558 provides for payment of railroad em-
ployees twice monthly. It seems to be the only North Carolina enactment of its
kind.
